Executive Summary

Given the potential for CT policies to make things worse — and indeed playing into the hands of terrorists by overreacting to threats and attacks, creating divisions within our societies and spreading disproportionate levels of fear in our societies — objectively and rigorously assessing success in CT is an essential process. It requires long-term, continued efforts supported by political will, with dedicated resources and reviewers independent from authorities. The process should be as transparent as possible and cover a broad spectrum; results should be shared and discussed amongst relevant groups, and, most importantly, acted upon. It should not only assess the effectiveness of policies but also their impacts, in particular social and governance-related impacts, and should help policy makers and front-line practitioners best mitigate the terrorist threat while guarding against societal harms.
“Under those eight years before (Barack) Obama came along, we didn’t have any successful radical Islamic terrorist attack in the United States [after 9/11].”

– Rudy Giuliani, in a speech in Youngstown, Ohio on August 15th, 2016¹

Aside from the fact that the US was afflicted by a number of terrorist attacks at least partly inspired by Islamist ideology in that period, including the so-called Beltway snipers in 2002, and in Chapel Hill in 2006, this type of statement is common amongst officials and analysts in North America and Western Europe. There haven’t been any terrorist attacks, therefore our strategy has been a success, or ‘there have been terrorist attacks, therefore our strategy has been a failure’, the logic goes. These simplistic assessments fail to take into consideration the myriad of factors to consider when evaluating counterterrorism (CT) policy, and convey an unrealistic message likely to propagate fear and irrational responses when an attack does occur.

In a context marked by a heightened terrorist threat since 9/11,² the extensive emotional impacts of terrorism,³ and the risks of counterproductive policy overreaction,⁴ assessing the effectiveness and impacts of counterterrorism policies in the West in a transparent, accountable and precise manner has become crucial. This paper will tackle this issue through the following five questions:

1. **What for?** (i.e., What is the purpose of reviewing policies devoted to countering terrorism?)
2. **Who?** (i.e., Who is best placed to do so?)
3. **What?** (i.e., What needs to be assessed?)
4. **Why not?** (i.e., Why are rigorous evaluations of CT policies too often lacking?)
5. **How?** (i.e., What quantitative and qualitative metrics can be used to assess success in the fight against terrorism?)

### 1. What for?

Since 2000, over 99 percent of deaths caused by terrorism around the world have been in “countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror.”⁵ Almost 75 percent of deaths from terrorism worldwide in 2016 occurred in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nigeria, countries that face challenges far greater than just terrorism, including civil war, protracted conflict, state abuses, weak governance and corruption.⁶ In those countries, relying on a CT lens to analyze and address such wide-ranging challenges is often restrictive and inadequate. What is broadly understood and discussed as terrorism⁷ thus rarely occurs in countries where an effective and transparent policy review at the local level is even possible. The more realistic process of reviewing CT policies in the West aims to ensure that policies are minimizing the threat effectively, and understand what can be improved upon, while guarding against the negative impacts of policy, including opportunity costs, disproportionate fear, discrimination against ethnic and religious groups, and violations of other civil liberties such as privacy rights.

### 2. Who?

In North America and Western Europe, where countries can rely on institutional capacity to review policies and readjust them accordingly, a number of different groups can spearhead the process.

**Institutional bodies:**

- **Independent reviewers**

In the UK for instance, the [Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-reviewer-of-terrorism-legislation) is autonomous from government and enjoys access “based on a very high degree of clearance to secret and sensitive national security information and personnel.”⁸ Statutory and non-statutory functions include a review of the Terrorism
Acts, which cover the definition of terrorism, terrorist property, terrorist investigations, arrest and detention, stop and search, port and border control, and terrorist offences. The Independent Reviewer writes annual reports and other one-off reports on relevant topics at the request of ministers or on his/her own initiative, frequently gives evidence to Parliament, talks to and writes in the media, participates in police training, and speaks at schools and universities.

- Parliamentary committees and sub-committees

These can be permanent — for example, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians in Canada; the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Home Affairs Select Committee in the UK; the House of Representatives subcommittees on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the US — or temporary, focusing on a specific mission — for example, the ‘investigative committee’ on the means put in place by the state to fight against terrorism” in France.²

- Ad hoc commissions

The most well known group of the sort is the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission. Between November 2002 and August 2004, the commission’s mandate was to “prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks,” as well as to “provide recommendations to guard against future attacks.”³ This independent and bipartisan commission was created by congressional legislation and signature of President George W. Bush, and was composed of retired senior officials, including former US representatives, senators, governors and attorneys. In 2006, the Canadian federal government appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 (1985) to shed light on the bombing — the deadliest terrorist attack in Canadian history — and produce policy recommendations. The commission released its final report in 2010.⁴

- Non-government bodies

While governments are not always best placed to conduct those evaluations themselves, they often provide crucial funding to individuals and organizations outside government for research and analysis on the matter. Between 2011 and 2016, Public Safety Canada’s Kanishka project — a $10-million initiative named after the Air India Flight 182 plane — funded almost 70 research projects on terrorism-related issues, including policy evaluations, and supported a range of events bringing together researchers, officials, practitioners and community members.⁵ The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre) later took over from the Kanishka project, notably providing funding through its Community Resilience Fund, and “working with partners to better measure and evaluate what works, what does not, and what is promising for countering radicalization to violence.”⁶

- Academia

Outside government, academics have an important role to play in providing scientific evidence to inform policy and practice. These may include researchers in the fields of terrorism, CT, (violent) extremism, radicalization, disengagement, desistance, de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration as such, as well as other relevant disciplines, including psychology, public policy, economics, sociology, criminology, conflict studies, international relations, policing and security studies.

- Think tanks and training institutes

Independent, non-partisan think tanks can play an important part as well, engaging academia, governments, civil society and the private sector through policy-relevant events, networks and rigorous analysis. Though not a think tank per se, the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) serves that purpose by bridging the gap between researchers and officials, and fostering new academic research on those topics.⁷ Similarly, training institutes that provide training and capacity building for practitioners have an important perspective to share in policy evaluation.

- Civil society organizations (CSOs)

CSOs at the local level are often well placed to assess
the effectiveness and impacts of policies directed toward individuals and communities with some distrust toward government (for example, New York University/Stanford University study on drone strikes). At the international level, CSOs working across countries can help assess the success of foreign policy interventions, and establish relationships beyond cumbersome state bureaucracies. Human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty also play a crucial role in holding governments and the international community accountable.

- **Private sector organizations**
  Private sector organizations can also help evaluate the CT policies, using their models, experience and expertise in measuring performance in other sectors.

- **Media**
  The media helps frame and shape the discourse on terrorism and CT. It thus has a clear responsibility to communicate facts about attacks, the governments’ response to them and their broader efforts to prevent them from happening in the first place. Often, investigative journalism helps uncover central elements of CT measures that would have otherwise remained hidden from the public.

In sum, several types of organizations have a role to play in reviewing CT policy, and often can complement one another. Most importantly, these efforts are best led by non-partisan, autonomous or independent, objective and evidence-based reviewers.

### 3. What?

CT policies are multi-faceted and cover a broad spectrum of measures that should all be evaluated. The four pillars of CONTEST, the UK’s CT strategy, represent key phases:

- “**Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks**”, which primarily involves law enforcement, intelligence, and justice authorities;
- “**Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism**”, which can be referred to as the CVE (countering violent extremism) or PVE (preventing violent extremism) component of CT; and
- “**Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack**”, which includes both physical and online components; and
- “**Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack**”, where first responders and critical infrastructure providers take on an important role, both with regard to physical injuries and psychological trauma. An important fifth pillar or phase of CT is rehabilitation, which can also be considered part of the “prevent” phase. This can be carried out with convicted offenders serving time in prisons, or through reinsertion programs for returning foreign terrorist fighters.

Additional elements related to the far-reaching scope of CT include the fact that CT involves tackling terrorist threats at home and abroad; requires partnerships at the local, national and international levels (including with civil society actors, on a bilateral basis with individual countries and multilaterally with organizations like the United Nations (UN) or NATO and with the private sector); and encompasses both legislation and action.

### 4. Why not?

Comprehensive, independent, well-designed and detailed evaluations of CT that are followed up are not always commonplace. Why?

There are several factors behind the relative lack of rigorous evaluations led or commissioned by government. As just pointed out, there are numerous facets and stakeholders to take into account when evaluating CT. Terrorism is a widely encompassing term with no consensus on definition, which means there is often confusion as to what should even be evaluated. Evaluation programs also require significant time and personnel, and often there are not enough resources dedicated to that endeavour. More broadly speaking, evaluation requires the ability and willingness for self-critique — a difficult exercise to engage in when there is little political capital to be gained and the risks are relatively high. Vested interests, ideological stubbornness, career aspirations, funding incentives and overall resistance to change may compound those issues. Governments also tend to be reluctant to reveal
vulnerabilities, either for strategic and operational security reasons (vis-à-vis adversaries) or for electoral and other political purposes. Given short electoral cycles, the focus is often on the short term, while evaluation programs may require longer timelines. Last, but not least, CT is often reactive: after a terrorist attack, government officials often feel the need to be seen to be doing something, which may lead to overspending, and putting in place knee-jerk measures that are not based on an adequate assessment of potential risks and benefits.

For researchers in universities and think tanks, measuring success in CT can also be challenging. There is often little funding to begin that type of research in the first place. Governments may also be unwilling to share data on their activities, including details of thwarted plots, or public spending on each aspect of CT, and institutional complexities can be difficult to navigate. Perhaps more importantly, establishing causality between policy and developments on the ground is no easy task. In other words, how do we know that the terrorist threat is up/down because of government actions? There are often no counterfactuals or control groups, particularly on the prevention front, to answer the following questions: What would have happened without that CT intervention? And why did one group of individuals with similar characteristics not engage in terrorist activities while another one did? There are several practical, judicial and ethical obstacles that may prevent researchers from gathering useful data on dissuaded would-be terrorists.

5. How?

In that context, there are a number of quantitative and qualitative metrics that can be used to try and assess whether a government has been successful in countering terrorism. First and foremost, performance should always be measured against objectives. The issue here is that objectives can be poorly formulated, frequently changed, vague or unrealistic. For instance, we often hear of the aim to “eradicate” terrorism, or the need for “100 percent security”; however, terrorism is not a threat that can be eradicated, but a risk that can be managed and mitigated, something the UK recognizes through CONTEST.

Quantitative metrics

As mentioned at the outset, the number of terrorist attacks or its evolution over a period of time is often the main metric used to assess the effectiveness of policies in place. While this can be a useful metric used in conjunction with others, a number of caveats are worth highlighting: some attacks are more impactful — both physically and psychologically — than others; fewer attacks may mean that an organization is planning a larger, more sophisticated one; there may not be a causal link between a policy intervention and a decrease in the number of attacks; and some attacks are simply unavoidable. The question of how these attacks were reduced is also central: if a government employs excessive violence, routinely violates human rights, undermines the rule of law and society cohesion, and generally lowers the quality of life of its citizens, the policy cannot be considered a success.

The number of people arrested, charged or convicted of terrorism offences is another important metric. But an increase in that number can be interpreted as a sign of success for authorities effectively targeting dangerous individuals, or as a sign of failure — more arrests may also mean a larger pool of dangerous individuals posing a threat to society. False positives should also be taken into account: more arrests may mean that the public and government are paying more attention to the issue, but may also lead to a high number of releases, hence the importance of looking at conviction figures. Operational success may also differ from strategic success: while law enforcement has effectively arrested people, how do we know that these efforts are having a sustainable impact — and that terrorist groups are not growing in numbers, resources, popularity or their capacity to carry out sophisticated attacks? Discriminate and disproportionate law enforcement interventions can drive terrorist recruitment and lead to more division and violence.

Similarly, the number of top terrorist targets killed or captured has been an important way for officials — especially in the US — to communicate their “successes”

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2 For research on evaluation of prevention efforts more specifically, see ‘further reading’ section.
in countering terrorism worldwide. Nonetheless, research shows that a kingpin strategy, which was particularly prevalent in the fight against Al Qaeda, may create a more decentralized, volatile, and resilient adversary, and tends to generate greater violence against civilians.

Plots foiled and prevented can be a good indicator of law enforcement performance. Once again, it is important to look beyond the basic numbers, and examine the long-term impacts of those interventions, as well as the details of cases. For instance, in 2006, a group referred to as “Miami 7” was arrested for plotting to blow up Chicago’s Sears Tower (now named Willis Tower). US officials often refer to that operation as one of the country’s key CT successes. At a press conference following the arrests, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales thanked the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) leadership in the investigation and said: “this case clearly demonstrates our commitment to preventing terrorism through energetic law enforcement efforts aimed at detecting and thwarting terrorist acts.”

As security analyst Bruce Schneier and others later pointed out, the group had “no weapons, no bombs, no expertise, no money and no operational skill,” and an FBI undercover agent who had infiltrated the group had in fact suggested the plot in the first place. Entrapment is an issue that resonates in Canada as well. In July 2016, the BC Supreme Court overturned terror convictions against the two individuals plotting to bomb the BC Legislature in 2013, concluding: “This is truly a case where the RCMP manufactured the crime... The police took two people who held terrorist beliefs but no apparent capacity or means to plan, act on or carry through with their religiously motivated objectives and they counselled, directed, urged, instructed and moulded them into people who could, with significant and continuous supervision and direction by the police, play a small role in a terrorist offence.”

Writing about the verdict, University of Ottawa Professor Craig Forcese and University of Toronto Professor Kent Roach noted, “Overaggressive stings amount to self-fulfilling prophecies, as people are encouraged to violent intentions they would otherwise never act on.”

Officials often refer to deportations or citizenship revocations as indicators of CT success, showing how authorities effectively removed individuals posing a threat from the country. However, this practice merely passes on the problem and responsibility to other countries, at times with records of human rights violations, abuses in prisons, lack of due process, and so forth. It also gives the erroneous impression that terrorism is first and foremost a problem associated with immigrants and foreigners, while evidence shows otherwise.

The number of successfully rehabilitated/reintegrated terrorism offenders is an important metric to integrate into evaluation efforts, despite difficulties including measurement challenges, and the need for regular and sustained assessments.

Other process-related figures include the amount of money spent on CT, the number of new programs or organizations created to focus on the matter; or the size of an international coalition against terrorism to determine whether governmental efforts have been successful. But these may not necessarily reflect reality. Why, how and to what end that money is spent, what impact it has and to what extent efforts are having positive repercussions are much more important determinants.

As Raphael Perl, then at the US Congressional Research Library, once put it, “A common pitfall of governments seeking to demonstrate success in anti-terrorist measures is overreliance on quantitative indicators, particularly those which may correlate with progress but not accurately measure it, such as the amount of money spent on anti-terror efforts.”

This highlights the need to turn to qualitative metrics to add more nuance and sophistication to our evaluation of CT policies.

**Qualitative metrics**

Qualitative metrics to evaluate efforts to counter terrorism can be divided into three main categories: the level and nature of the threat, the government response, and the society’s response.

First, assessing the terrorist threat, including how it has evolved in potency and nature, is a key exercise, albeit an arduous one. Evaluating the threat can be done in various ways, notably: 1) through measuring the effectiveness of terrorist organizations themselves (including how they communicate, raise funds, recruit or procure weapons), how easily they carry out attacks,
the scale and sophistication of those attacks, the number of defectors, and so forth; and 2) by analyzing to what extent the terrorist group's ideas, ideology and objectives are gaining popularity or being increasingly ignored or debunked in a number of significant environments, including schools, prisons, religious and social centres, online forums and on social media. Only through an accurate assessment of the nature and potency of the threat can governments begin to effectively respond to it.

Second, evaluating the effectiveness of governments' responses to terrorism is imperative. A "successful" response may be characterized by:

a) an effective, proportionate and swift response from first responders, especially by law enforcement and medical services — recent examples include the Toronto Police Service response to the van attack in April 2018, police response to the attack on London Bridge in June 2017 and the medical response to the November 2015 attacks in Paris, which saved multiple lives and led to further reviews and improvements;

b) quick coordination between relevant government authorities — one of the common pitfalls of CT (for example, the 9/11 Commission criticized the poor communication between the FBI and CIA leading up to the attacks, and the position of director of national intelligence (DNI) was later created to more effectively coordinate the US Intelligence Community);

c) a swift recovery, in which things go back normal shortly after the attack, including key government services and transportation;

d) limited negative societal impacts of terrorism, in particular on community cohesion, discrimination, minority rights, public perceptions, civil liberties, checks and balances, press freedom and so on — for instance, the city of Toronto’s response to the April 2018 van attack was overall marked by restraint, compassion and resilience;

e) minimal impact of terrorist attacks on a country’s economy and society (in particular a low number of casualties, little economic impact and minimal damage to the critical infrastructure); and

f) a discourse by political leaders that is rational, measured and reassuring — terrorism scholar Beatrice de Graaf found that “it is not necessarily the policy measures and their intended results as such, but much more the way in which they are presented and perceived, that determine the overall effect of the policy in question.” After the July 2011 attacks in Oslo and the island of Utøya, then Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg aptly declared: “We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give up our values. Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity... We will answer hatred with love.”

It is also important to take into consideration any potential geographical or functional displacement. In other words, while policies may effectively mitigate the threat posed by one terrorist group in one country, they may also merely shift the threat to another country or group.

Third, the way societies respond to terrorism can be a useful indicator of policy success. On May 22, 2017, as young spectators were exiting the Manchester Arena following an Ariana Grande concert, a bomb detonated, killing 27 people. Only two weeks later, 50,000 people attended One Love Manchester, a benefit concert given to honour the victims, promote society cohesion and foster a peaceful response to terrorism. This event, like the peaceful gatherings in the streets of France hours after the attack against Charlie Hebdo, demonstrated positive resilience in the face of terror. The ability of everyday citizens to “go about their lives freely and with confidence” is a cornerstone objective of CONTEST and other CT strategies, and should therefore be measured when evaluating CT success.

In an appropriate and positive societal response, the level of fear should be commensurate to the threat amongst a public that is informed, resilient, confident in their government’s ability to effectively tackle the issue, and keen to partner with and report to authorities. When it comes to reporting, it is worth emphasizing the need to go beyond quantitative data, once again, to identify cases of under- or overreporting, and assess, for instance, when an increase or decrease in reporting may be related to efforts from local authorities to reach out to community leaders and publicize ways to report hate crime and violent extremism. Similarly, analyzing the quality of reporting experiences can help improve practices.

Media coverage of a terrorist attack or of terrorism
broadly speaking can have a powerful impact on the response by society or government and should, therefore, be evaluated as well. While the media’s contribution to the copycat effect of school shootings is well established, there is some evidence suggesting that more media coverage may also lead to more terrorist attacks. Media coverage can certainly contribute to polarization of society, discrimination against specific groups — including Muslims — if reportage is not conducted properly. While Londoners were quick to carry on with their lives after the Westminster Bridge attack in March 2017, mainstream media provided inadequate live coverage, spreading misinformation about the identity of the attacker, distributing photos of the lockdown in Parliament and disseminating details of Prime Minister Theresa May’s location (including the model of the car she was in when driven back to 10 Downing Street) — sensitive material that could have been used by perpetrators at the time, and of little importance to viewers. In contrast, Canadian media coverage of the 2014 Parliament Hill shooting and the 2018 Toronto van attack was, in general, more appropriate, honouring the victims, resisting the urge to overreact and focusing on society cohesion.

Conclusions

“Counterterrorism is more art than science,” Gus Martin points out. The success of CT policies cannot be boiled down to an algorithm. Terrorist activity is indeed inspired and influenced by a range of factors, such as corruption, weak governance, state abuses, socioeconomic inequalities, military interventions, history, ideology and religion. The level of the threat will thus partly depend on the ability of governments to create the conditions to mitigate potential sources of anger and urge for revenge. In that environment, evaluating the effectiveness and impacts of CT is a challenging endeavour.

While presenting the findings of my book in 2015, I was often asked which countries were the most successful in countering terrorism. There is no straightforward answer to that question. Norway’s overall response to the Breivik attacks, or the Danish city of Aarhus’ program to reintegrate returning foreign terrorist fighters can be considered useful models to learn from. But contexts vary greatly from one country to another. Terrorist activity in Portugal, for instance, differs sharply from France, let alone Nigeria, Pakistan, Iraq or other countries outside Western Europe and North America. And this is not simply a result of CT policies per se. But given extensive research on terrorism, we now have a better idea of which practices may be most effective and least harmful.

Adequately evaluating CT may at times seem impossible. However, given the potential for making things worse through policy, and indeed playing into the hands of terrorists by overreacting to threats and attacks, by creating divisions within our societies and by spreading disproportionate levels of fear in our societies, objectively and rigorously assessing success in CT is nonetheless an essential process. It is one that requires long-term, continued efforts supported by political will, with dedicated resources and reviewers independent from authorities, and one that is as transparent as possible, covers a broad spectrum, and whose results are shared and discussed amongst relevant groups, and most importantly acted upon. It should not only assess the effectiveness of policies but also their impacts, in particular social and governance-related impacts.

As Tim Harford indeed notes, “Targets tend to be simple while the world is complicated.” Lessons can be learnt from drug policy reform in that regard. Traditional evaluation metrics include amounts of drugs seized, size of eradicated crops, number of drug traffickers arrested and consumption levels of particular drugs. But research has shown that while these metrics can point to what is considered success, reality on the ground may be different. For instance, greater drug seizures or arrests may simply point to luck, and do not take into consideration the impacts of policy, including on violence, the ability of drug traffickers’ organizations to smuggle drugs or poverty levels amongst farmers. Similarly, policy interventions may have simply pushed drug production and trafficking to neighbouring countries, or drug use to other substances. This demonstrates the need for a greater focus on “outcome indicators,” as the International Drug Policy Consortium notes. These include a positive policy impact on society, i.e., how policies contributed to “wider social goals under the headings of health, human rights, development, and security”; context-specific assessments; prioritization, for example, “with a focus on the most harmful aspects... rather than on low-level...vulnerable communities”;}
While important differences exist between the two fields, the CT community would do well to continue, and move beyond, traditional metrics and critically rethink how to assess success in tackling terrorism.
Notes


7. Defined in this paper as the use of violence or threat thereof by non-state actors primarily targeting civilians with the intent to generate fear, panic and political change. Several contentious issues remain when it comes to defining terrorism, including whether state actors, attacks against the military and legitimate pro-independence movements should be included in the definition. For more on the definition of terrorism, see, for example, the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research.


22. Lee Jarvis, “How Might we Evaluate


26. van Dongen, “Break it Down.”


32. Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, “Entrapment


35. For research on the evaluation of prevention efforts more specifically, see the further reading section.


43. van Dongen, “Break it Down.”


46. UK Home Office, “Contest.”


58. The Toronto Star, “Toronto can be proud of how it faced the van attack,” Editorial, April 23, 2018.


64. Laura Dawson, Charlie Edwards and Calum Jeffray,


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Acronyms list

CIA Central Intelligence Agency  
CSO civil society organization  
CT counterterrorism  
CVE countering violent extremism  
DNI director of national intelligence  
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
PVE preventing violent extremism  
TSAS Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society  
UN United Nations

Further Reading:


Bibliography


Dear, Keith Patrick. “Beheading the Hydra? Does Killing


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Benoît Gomis is a researcher on organized crime and terrorism. He is a research associate at Simon Fraser University, where he focuses on the illicit tobacco trade, and an adjunct instructor at American University, where he teaches an MA course on researching terrorism. Benoît is also a senior fellow with the Canadian International Council (CIC), an associate fellow with Chatham House, an independent consultant and the author of Counterterrorism: Reassessing the Policy Response (Taylor & Francis, 2015), which he wrote as a visiting scholar at the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS). He is a frequent contributor to Jane's Intelligence Review, World Politics Review and the international media. He previously worked at Chatham House, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly and the French Ministry of Defence. He was educated at Sciences Po in Aix-en-Provence, Loyola University Chicago and the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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