AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: ICE MOVING OUT?

by

JAMES M. MINIFIE
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By JAMES M. MINIFIE*

AMERICAN foreign policy is making one of those historic changes of direction and tempo so bewildering to professional diplomats, so stirring to the foreigner and ultimately to the American public, too.

President Eisenhower's emotional reception in Europe—sentimental in Bonn, romantic in London, dramatic in Paris—was reflected on Capitol Hill in a series of political triumphs and in the country by a surge of personal popularity which wiped out years of disillusionment.

The hope of people everywhere for a new era of international understanding alarms professional diplomats, who fear lest it push the West into injudicious concessions which might bring disillusion. But even they are aware that President Eisenhower's conviction that "Peace is imperative" has seized popular imagination in Novosibirsk and Warsaw, as well as in the West. It has dramatic possibilities.

Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States, however, was regarded by Americans with mixed feelings. Fortunately perhaps, his hard terms for co-existence offered in his article in Foreign Affairs damped expectations of easy success. The Russian leaders are still distrusted. The recurrence of trouble in Laos renewed doubts of Communist sincerity, although it also caused some to wonder whether Mr. Khrushchev was not more troubled by Mao Tse-Tung than the western world was by Mr. Khrushchev.

Somewhat over-simplified, American policy is moving away from massive retaliation, with its implication of pre-emptive war. USAF General T. S. Power's book discussing this was banned by the Defense Department. It looks to something which for the moment can best be defined by the Eisenhower-Macmillan slogan "Peace with Justice". This may not be attainable, and Justice of course is open to some odd definitions; but the attempt to achieve it can be significant for the standing of the western alliance with

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the uncommitted world, and even for the unsatisfied longings of humanity behind the Iron Curtain.

Policy—despite popular doubts—is moving away from the dogma that Russian leaders are incorrigible and their pledges wholly untrustworthy, and that tension must therefore be maintained to preserve the network of alliances until the present Soviet rulers die off, when Russian consumer dissatisfaction will force a change of Communist policy.

It is seeking some understanding and agreement with the Iron Curtain in which the interests of both parties will be strong enough to insure observance. The identification of such interests is the task of diplomacy, and Christian Herter, the new Secretary of State, is a diplomat. He is also phenomenally self-effacing and only too happy to encourage the President to undertake diplomatic tasks for which he is exceptionally suited.

“What we are talking about now,” as President Eisenhower put it, “is finding some little break, some little avenue yet unexplored, through which we can possibly move toward a better situation. . . . We are talking about the human race, and what’s going to happen to it.”

That was why Premier Khrushchev was invited to the United States. That is the reason behind the President’s return visit to Russia.

“I wanted to explore for myself,” the President continued, speaking to his press conference, “whether this man personally was ready or had any intention of making a suggestion that the free world could study and look at, and possibly accept, and in doing so, put us all on a better path toward, first of all reducing tensions and secondly to the development of greater programs in the future.”

In other words, American policy is moving toward a broader world concept, akin to the old Point Four, happily apostrophized by an unreconstructed Republican in the days when a Democrat lived at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, as “a quart of milk for every Hottentot.”

President Eisenhower described his mission to Europe as intended “to explore ways and means in which our government may equitably and effectively co-operate in helping solve one of the most pressing problems of our time, that of assisting to advance the cultural, health and living standards of the almost two billion people in the world who are citizens of the newly developing or underdeveloped countries.”
This is a far cry from Foster Dulles' scornful dictum at a National Press Club luncheon: "The State Department is not running a popularity contest. Most of these people, we don't care whether they like us or not, so long as they respect us. And I think they do."

Why Policy is Changing

What caused the change? Partly, the evidence that the alliances were falling to pieces, partly the realization that the expenditures of forty-one billion dollars annually just in the engines, training and preparations for war could not be sustained in perpetuity even by the United States. It was partly the increasingly obvious danger that the uncommitted, have-not nations would not be disposed to wait out the life-span of the Soviet rulers. It was partly fear that unless the West offered some alternative, even the friendliest of the new-born powers of Africa and Asia, even the Latin American nations on the door-step, would have no choice but to embrace the Communist Short Cut to the Better Life.

To some degree the change marked recovery from the sputnik panic, when no achievement seemed out of reach of the brilliant Russian technicians. After nearly two years of effective competition, with a solidly based future programme of space exploration worked out (in close co-operation with the United Kingdom, and not neglecting the contribution Canada can make to instrumentation), the American public no longer thinks the Russians are ten feet tall. They may indeed put a man into space first, and are likely to accept much greater risks for the unfortunate volunteer than American opinion would admit. But this is not likely to match the impact of the original sputnik.

The change reflected public realization that there is no alternative to peace, that massive retaliation means mutual extermination, and that the threat of it has been impotent to stop small wars, horribly dangerous experiments with arson in an arsenal.

The reluctant and piecemeal revelation of the problems with which nuclear testing has endowed the world and posterity also stimulated change. Nuclear fall-out has recently been shown to be much more dangerous in its short-term consequences, and no less deleterious in the long term, than the Atomic Energy Commission had portrayed it in the days when an atomic bomb was seriously advocated—and rejected by Mr. Eisenhower—as an acceptable alternative to disaster at Dienbienphu.
Part of the change must be credited to Senator Fulbright as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and to the able liberal Democrats on the Committee. Senator Mansfield of Montana is fertile in new ideas, bold and forceful in expressing them. Senator Humphrey of Minnesota’s eight-hour “talkathon” with Premier Khrushchev may have laid the train for subsequent exchanges—it certainly promoted the visits of Deputy Premiers Mikoyan and Kozlov, which in turn made possible the Nixon-Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange.

Senator Church of Idaho, a youthful newcomer, is already cutting a wide swathe. The irrepressible Senator Morse of Oregon emanates power whether right or wrong. Senator Clair Engle of California, who defeated Senator Knowland, the arch-enemy of recognition of mainland China, compounded this victory by advocating recognition of China in a remarkable Senate speech. He is not a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he is making his mark in foreign policy discussions.

These brilliant men delivered to the Senate over the past twelve months speeches designed not to win divisions but to educate Senators and the public. They spoke for the most part as the spirit moved. Sometimes they talked to a small gathering of constituents or some obscure banquet. The text was inserted into the Congressional Record in that Morning Hour which opens the Senate’s legislative day, allowing Senators three minutes to weave a short introduction for their tapestry. The absence of a rule of relevance in the Senate enables it to perform a unique function of political education. Its proceedings, documented by inserted matter far more liberally than Hansard permits, are carried by the Congressional Record to the most remote parts of the country, where they are carefully read by the natural leaders of the community. Every alert Congressman and Senator is aware of the educational function of the Congressional Record.

From Dulles to Herter

A situation which had been long working up was catalyzed last May by a dramatic event, the death of John Foster Dulles. The change was almost tangible to those who mourned bareheaded in the steamy sunshine beside the open grave on the Arlington hillside. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, white and drawn, and Madame Chiang Kai Shek, in her unchanging beauty, must have known that they were survivors of an era, and that Mr. Dulles’ policy was buried in the same coffin with its author under the yellow-wood tree.
Dr. Adenauer patently wanted nothing of what he divined would be the New Era. He hurried home, changed his mind about taking the presidency of West Germany, and advertised by retaining the more powerful Chancellorship that he would oppose and obstruct the new era as far and as long as in him lay. He would have been correct in surmising that Christian Herter was less inclined than Mr. Dulles to believe that German character had decisively changed in the last fifteen years.

Standing to one side, inconspicuous in a group of subordinates, Mr. Herter rested against a high stool to relieve his arthritic hips of his weight. He had been named Secretary of State six weeks before, but only after Mr. Eisenhower had hesitated so long, and seemed so uncertain, that Vice President Richard Nixon reportedly had to point out to the President that unless Mr. Herter was appointed, he would have little option but to resign, and that if ultimately he was to be given the post, every day’s delay diminished his prestige.

The President’s hesitancy had bared his numbing grief at the death of his friend, “the most valuable man in foreign affairs I have ever known.” Mr. Dulles had had a free hand in the formation and application of foreign policy, as no Secretary of State had enjoyed since the days of Elihu Root, fifty years before. He had removed the burden of foreign affairs from the President’s shoulders, much as Sherman Adams had assumed the tedium of internal affairs, while Bob Taft had been the trusted mahout in the jungle of Capitol Hill.

With these three removed, two by death, one by misadventure, the President seemed helpless, unable to take a decision, insensitive to all but his loss. His difficulty was enhanced by Mr. Herter’s affliction. The President insisted that he undergo a thorough physical examination. Whether or not the foreign policy of the leading power of the western world in the ideological conflict between democracy and communism should be directed by Mr. Herter was submitted to the decision of a panel of medical men whose experience and competence were uniquely with the body.

The President had told his press conference, without visible enthusiasm, that Mr. Herter’s health was probably good enough to carry him for the remainder of the Administration’s life.

Under such dubious auspices had Mr. Herter been appointed. But those who attended the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on his confirmation judged that this can-
didate for the Senate's advice and consent brought a new quality to his great office, and that the Foreign Relations Committee heartily approved the change. The extended agony of Mr. Dulles' mortal illness, and the eulogies which marked its termination, had obscured the fact that his policies and attitudes had antagonized the Democratic majority of the committee. Senator Fulbright had accused Mr. Dulles of misleading the committee. The committee planned a vast study of the direction and results of United States foreign policy all over the world and had made it clear that Mr. Dulles would face a critical panel. Senator Humphrey had called his policies misdirected and inadequate. Senator Morse had harsher words for them; he had demanded the impeachment of their author.

President Eisenhower had insisted that Mr. Dulles' policies would be carried on by Mr. Herter, who had dutifully paid tribute to the merits of continuity in state affairs. It might therefore have been supposed that the wrath of the committee against Mr. Dulles and his works would have been focussed equally on his successor. Nothing could have been further from the event.

The committee, which had chafed under the President's long indecision over the nomination, suspended the rule that nominations should lie before it six days before hearings began. They opened the next morning, lasted one hour and produced a unanimous recommendation to the Senate to confirm.

Not to be outdone, the Senate also suspended its rule that such matters should lie before it for two days, and interrupted business to debate confirmation that very afternoon. The debate was confined to flowery eulogies. Mr. Herter was confirmed by the unanimous vote of all 93 Senators present. The five absentees sent word that they too wished to be recorded affirmatively. Hearings, debate and vote had taken in all less than four hours, a very remarkable tribute.

What occasioned this extraordinary accolade? Unanimous approval had been the goal of Foster Dulles. He had failed to reach it despite, or possibly because of, a round of appeasement of the Dirksens, Jenners, McCarthys and Knowlands which hung millstones around United States policy from the day the Eisenhower Administration took office.

Mr. Herter's Background

A clue to the distinction made by the Senate between the two policy heads came from non-members of the Foreign Relations Committee, who appeared at the hearings as guests. They recalled
that they had been members of the House of Representatives in the 1947 session when Representative Herter, Republican of Massachusetts, had organized the forces of the lower house, then strongly Republican, isolationist and economy-minded, to pass the legislation required to establish the Marshall Plan. This had appeared to some powerful Republican stalwarts to be a Democratic boondoggle of unparalleled proportions, designed to pour money for five years into foreign parts which wouldn’t yield one vote in a million.

Chairman Fulbright recalled appreciatively that Representative Herter had been vice-chairman of the special committee to shepherd this revolutionary Democratic legislation through the Republican house. In that capacity he had organized a huge junket, known derisively as “Herter’s Circus,” to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of conditions in Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Only in appearance however, was this a junket. Senator Case of South Dakota remembered that every day had produced its quota of reports to be digested, articles to be scanned, experts to be heard.

These tributes contrasted with the decennial celebration a month before of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at which everyone else associated with the establishment of the Marshall Plan and the foundation of NATO had received due mention: General Marshall, whose name the Plan bore; Dean Acheson, who worked it up; President Truman who bought it and Senator Vandenberg, who had established the bi-partisan accord which put the legislation through the Senate. Everyone was remembered, in fact, but Mr. Herter, the man who won victory in the toughest battle of all. Under Secretary Herter had indeed read a short, pleasant paper to the NATO Council, but he modestly omitted his own name and nobody else supplied it.

It was the best Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark which the Washington scene has yet produced. It was the most significant commentary on the character of the present Secretary of State, the clue to his methods and the key to his success. If this incident is kept in mind, it will throw light on much that is obscure in the change-over in American foreign policy. The key is this: Mr. Herter understands the art of finding common ground. He is also an excellent organizer, anxious not to overlook any instrument for the implementation of American foreign policy, and happy to have the credit taken by anyone but himself. This is the deep, underlying contrast between Mr. Herter’s methods and Mr. Dulles’. Mr. Dulles would have nobody but himself in
the limelight; he even accepted the President's initiatives reluctantly. Mr. Herter, on the other hand, recognizes the Presidency as the unequalled instrument for the execution of foreign policy and has already succeeded not only in exciting the President about his role, but in encouraging Mr. Eisenhower in the pursuit of those humanitarian concepts whose expression endeared General Eisenhower to the Allies, and first attracted attention to him as a presidential possibility.

Lack of personal vanity does not mean that Mr. Herter lacks policies. This became clear from the critical ninety-minute confirmation hearing, although it attracted so little attention generally that the New York Times, an avid publisher of documentation, did not print the text even of the salient parts of the hearing. Nevertheless it is a document of prime importance in the transformation of United States foreign policy. In his replies even to perfunctory questions, as most were, Mr. Herter stated his principles, quietly but precisely. They proclaimed the departure from the old order to every diplomat who read them or was present. Few were present and apparently few read them. There were less than two score in the committee room last April 21. They were women for the most part, friends . . . fewer than crushed in that same day to the hearings on Admiral Lewis Strauss’ nomination — ultimately rejected by the Senate — as Secretary of Commerce.

At one point Mr. Herter moved away from the minimal answer into a revealing reminiscence: he had been fortunate enough in World War I to work on an agreement with the Germans on treatment of prisoners, "which everybody thought at the time wouldn't be worth the paper it was written on" he said with a disarming smile.* But it proved to be to the interest of both parties and it worked.

In this brief reminiscence Mr. Herter cast away the principle frequently voiced by Mr. Dulles that it was a waste of time trying to negotiate with the Russians, that their word was worthless and that agreements with them were not worth the paper they were written on unless they had enforceable penalties for violation. The principle which Mr. Herter was laying down was that any agreement which is to the interest of both parties will be honoured as long as that interest endures and that the task of diplomacy is to find and define that mutual interest. This is the distinction between the approach of the diplomat and that of the lawyer, the profession Mr. Dulles ornamented.

*This clause was omitted from the printed record.
The Question of War

The implications of Mr. Herter's apparently casual anecdote were not wasted on Senator Fulbright. The shadow of a smile flitted over his thin features. He had a few more questions designed to bring out circumstances which Mr. Herter had modestly omitted from his career. Twelve years in the Massachusetts State Assembly; two terms as Governor of the State; ten years in the U.S. House of Representatives; perfect French (it's rusty, said Herter), working German. Then he turned him over to the other members and visiting firemen. Questioning was a formality until Senator Morse's turn came. The impetuous Senator from Oregon probed deeply, and elicited declarations of principle, which are so important that the discussion is given at length:

Senator Morse. . . . Possibly I could best put my question in this hypothetical: Let's assume in the Berlin crisis, with the Russians buzzing American airplanes above the 10,000-foot level, some trigger-happy Russian, either by orders, by disobedience of orders, or conceivably by accident shot down one of those planes.

Would you consider that an act of war on the part of Russia against the United States?

Mr. Herter. Not necessarily, Senator. I think that there is always a factor of the accidental or incidental event that can take place through miscalculation, misjudgment on one side or another.

To my mind the very factor that you have outlined, the seriousness of all-out nuclear war, is so great that minor incidents ought never to be the cause of the kind of holocaust which you have described.

Our defences are purely for defensive purposes and the President has made it very clear that we are not going to fire the first shot. I personally feel that the Russians are realistic enough not to want this type of war any more than we want this type of war, and that the cautions that we ought to maintain from the point of view of having incidents cause war are very real cautions.

Senator Morse. . . . Using the Berlin crisis as a hypothetical, although we know there are many other spots in the world where in the not too distant future we may get ourselves into another crisis with the Russians, suppose we are satisfied that they start shooting down American planes over the corridor deliberately and intentionally and wilfully.

Would you consider that an act of war on the part of Russia toward the United States?
Mr. Herter. When you define an act of war I am not sure whether you are defining it in legalistic terms. When Mr. Spaak, the Secretary General of NATO, was here, I can recall his saying that in modern times nations do not declare war nor do they make peace. The incidents of war today can be such instantaneous matters that a formal declaration of war is often a byproduct rather than an original act. That I think emphasizes again the necessity for caution with respect to incidents.

I think, Senator, that what you are leading up to is when, if ever, is nuclear warfare justified?

Senator Morse. . . So I restate my question: Let us assume that you are satisfied that in the Berlin crisis the Russians openly and wilfully shoot down American planes over the corridor, where we think they have the right to be. We are satisfied that our position is within the framework of international law. Russia is outside the framework of international law. The question is, if they start shooting down planes wilfully, would you consider it to be an overt act of war?

Mr. Herter. Yes, I would consider that an overt act of war.

Senator Morse. I thank you for that answer. You know I ask it in view of our past conversation.

All right, we now have Russia committing an act of war against the United States over the Berlin crisis.

It is your position that at that point we would be free to and we should proceed with an all-out war against Russia, which means, according to my contention, the assumption that an all-out war would encompass the dropping of nuclear bombs?

Mr. Herter. No sir; I don’t think that in the initial stages we would be justified in such an act. I think in the initial stages we would have to take with what limited forces we have available, protective measures from the point of view of our planes.

If it became clear that the Russians were going to carry this thing to a point of all-out war themselves, then I think we would have to think very seriously about our position.

Senator Morse. Continuing with my second hypothetical: the act of overt war has been committed. I take it for granted that you would agree that the administration at the earliest possible moment would lay the facts before the Congress for a discussion as to whether or not a declaration of war should issue.

Mr. Herter. Oh, without any question. The only reservation that I would put on that would be if on the other side, we had
actually seen in the scopes attacking planes or missiles that would require instant retaliatory power on our part.

Senator Morse. . . . Coming to the third hypothetical now, is it your position that the question of execution of that war, to the extent that it may involve an all-out nuclear war, the Congress of the United States, under the Constitution, would have the right to expect to be consulted before a decision was made to make nuclear war?

Mr. Herter. . . . Reducing that question to responsible individuals, I can't conceive of the President of the United States involving us in an all-out unclear war unless the fact showed clearly that we are in danger of devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves.

In this brief dialogue, Mr. Herter committed the President to a new policy. For, however imprecisely, Mr. Eisenhower had publicly expressed doubt that in the case of a collision over access rights to Berlin, the use of atomic weapons could be avoided. But this may have been a last echo of Mr. Dulles' views, expressed when the President had visited him in hospital a day or so before the press conference. There was a characteristic Dulles ring about the statement that "if there is going to be any force, they (the Russians) have to use that to block our carrying out our responsibilities."

The Herter Policies

Mr. Herter's record and his views stated at the Senate hearing and elsewhere suggest that American foreign policy will:

1. Recognize the interdependence of the free world and lay particular emphasis on the claims of the have-not nations, with special attention to Latin America.

2. Seek agreements between the West and the Iron Curtain founded on mutual interest, and constantly under discussion and review.

3. Stand on the Germany proposals put forward at Geneva:
   a. No increase of forces in Berlin
   b. Guaranteed free access to Berlin
   c. Measures to avoid disturbing activities in either part of Berlin
   d. Agreement that these arrangements should last until German unification.

4. Reject automatic atomic warfare, and seek new disarmament and nuclear test talks.
5. Return to diplomatic procedure, using every available instrument to forward policy, especially the outstanding personal talents of President Eisenhower.

6. Establish much closer consultation and collaboration between the western allies.

7. Postpone action on Communist China.

8. Extend the atomic testing ban.

Atomic policy has been complicated by intrusion of Congress into the policy sphere as a result of the hostility generated by Admiral Lewis Strauss when he was Atomic Energy Commissioner. Specific legislation prevents information on nuclear warheads going to France, or the warheads themselves going to any nation in peace time, unless “in the custody and under the control of American forces.”

The exchange of visits between Mr. Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev may melt some of the cold war ice, but if Mr. Khrushchev’s announced conditions for peaceful co-existence are final, there is not much room for negotiation. Mr. Khrushchev wrote in Foreign Affairs that his terms were 1. No roll-back of communist territorial gains in Eastern Europe. 2. Recognition of the two German states and establishment of West Berlin as a Free City. 3. Removal of barriers to U.S.-Soviet trade.

The United States is less disposed than ever to recognize communist domination of Eastern Europe since Vice President Nixon personally experienced the warmth of Polish feeling towards America and against Russia. The German conditions are unacceptable. And there is no intention of financing Soviet purchases by U.S. loans, as Mr. Mikoyan suggested last winter.

**Geneva and the Khrushchev Visit**

Mr. Herter has had to implement his principles in difficult circumstances. The end-of-era chaos in which the death of Mr. Dulles left United States foreign policy was seized by the Russians as the ideal opportunity to enforce a solution of the Berlin and German problems along Kremlin lines. By insisting on a Summit Conference when Mr. Eisenhower would be deprived of the seeing-eye guidance of Mr. Dulles, Premier Khrushchev appeared to have the West at an irremediable disadvantage.

When Mr. Herter undertook the Foreign Ministers’ conference at Geneva he already knew that nothing was likely to come of it. Foreign Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev had said, were not competent to take policy decisions. “Gromyko will sit on a block
of ice for a month if I tell him to," Mr. Khrushchev had told Averell Harriman. "And if he didn’t I’d get someone else who would."

During the intermission in the Geneva conference Mr. Herter was back in Washington. President Eisenhower, anxious to employ "the last atom of prestige and the last atom of energy" in exploring any peace-making possibility regardless of the risk to his own prestige, conceived the idea of inviting Mr. Khrushchev to the United States. Mr. Eisenhower submitted it to the State Department (as he told his press conference) which meant to Mr. Herter, although the President, perhaps significantly, did not once name him. Mr. Herter saw the opportunity for breaking up the long trench-warfare stalemate and initiating a breathless open war of movement and initiative which he must have been reasonably sure of winning before he assented to it.

His part in this historic decision had no notice either from the President, the press or the Department. It is Mr. Herter’s characteristic way of operating. It is also characteristic that on his way back to Geneva Mr. Herter stopped off a day in Ottawa, not only to brief the Canadian Government, but as State Department officials made clear, to obtain the Canadian Government’s views. This again had not been Mr. Dulles’ standard practice.

Latin America

While Mr. Herter was held down in Geneva on a mission which he felt should have been delegated to a lower level after the opening exchanges, troubles lowered in Latin America. They focussed on Cuba, commanding two of the entrances to the Caribbean, and containing the vital U.S. naval base of Guantanamo Bay.

Cuba under Fidel Castro is going through the same sort of earthquakeing social revolution which Mexico experienced fifty years ago when the long dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz was overthrown. It took Mexico a generation to settle down. Events move more rapidly nowadays, but it would not seem unreasonable to expect a decade of trouble in Cuba, which will inevitably tax the persuasive powers of the Organization of American States to allay.

Revolutions need to proselytize. Castro had no sooner established himself in Havana than filibustering parties, shown to have originated in Cuba, appeared successively in Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic. They were suppressed without much difficulty but not before they had aroused anxiety in the State Department, always sensitive to agitation in the neigh-
borhood of the Panama Canal. Dictator Rafael Trujillo, the strong man of the Dominican Republic, replied in kind by sending an ill-fated plane-load of filibusters into Cuba where they fell into an ambush.

The Organization of American States decided to call an extraordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago di Chile to consider what could be done about the situation in the Caribbean. The significance of such meetings is not so much what is done as what is said. So far as the United States was concerned the right things were said. Legality was the key-note. Fidel Castro’s brother was coldly received in Chile a few hours after the conference had disbanded. His Foreign Minister had already dissipated such good-will as Cuba might have enjoyed. Special committees were set up to study and report on the Caribbean situation and on the origins and growth of dictators in the Americas.

In the last months of his life Mr. Dulles had appeared to be moving towards recognition of the urgent capital needs of Latin American nations. The case had been brilliantly advocated by Douglas Dillon, his Under Secretary of State for economic affairs, who had been given a free hand in his field. Mr. Dillon’s views were well received in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, although some of the more liberal Senators complained that they were not adventurous enough. At all events significant increases in funds for Latin American development have been made available through foreign aid, Public Law 480 purchases of farm surpluses, the Export-Import Bank and two important financial institutions: the Inter-American Development Institute and the Development Loan Fund.

These measures are important, but still not adequate. Latin America needs a major international aid programme. The initiative must come from the United States, but European and Canadian participation will be sought with some urgency. The principle of interdependence, laid down after the Macmillan-Eisenhower conversations in 1958 but dormant until recently, may attain new authority. There are two hopeful factors: Latin Americans are well aware of their political hazards; the United States is increasingly aware of their economic needs.

The Far East

Mr. Herter inherited an unnecessarily heavy burden in the Far East. The Administration’s China policy was fashioned by Mr. Dulles in 1952 in defiance of his own convictions expressed in his book on American policy published only two years before.
It was a needless gesture of appeasement to Senator Knowland, since repudiated by the California voters; to Senator Jenner, now retired from the public scene; to the late Senator Joseph McCarthy; to Senator Dirksen, now Mr. Eisenhower's trusted minority leader; to Senator Bridges and to the China lobby. The policy of "no truck nor trade with the heathen Chinee" was pushed to grotesque lengths. American newsmen who sought to cover China were reminded by Mr. Dulles at a press conference that they could and would be held personally liable to heavy fines and/or imprisonment under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 as amended.

When a reporter asked under what Congressional declaration of war the Chinese were considered an enemy, Mr. Dulles replied that an enemy was anyone so defined by Treasury regulations.

This situation was rectified in August 1957, but with so little fanfare that White House Press Secretary James Hagarty was unaware of it a year later. But by that time the Chinese had decided not to grant visas to American correspondents. So to this day such knowledge as the American public obtains of what goes on among 600,000,000 people is gleaned from the listening post at Hong-Kong, and stories or films from British and Canadian correspondents.

The Chinese suppression of Tibet and events in Laos have lent a specious validity to U.S. policy, but Washington cannot continue indefinitely to ignore the existence of one-fifth of the human race. Support for a more realistic policy is growing in the Senate and in the public. As often happens in the United States, when the change does come, it may come fast and leave present fellow-travellers somewhat out of countenance and step.

Canada

Policy towards Canada benefits by the general détente.

U.S. Treasury regulations implementing the total embargo on trade with China, imposed during the Korean War, led to an absurd situation; the transport in bond over a stretch of U.S. highway between two Canadian cities, of frozen shrimps originating in Red China, was prohibited as a threat to U.S. national security. This led to a Canadian protest and at the request of the State Department the Treasury regulation was modified. But the embargo, non-recognition and opposition to China entering the United Nations have been maintained, and substantially imposed on Canada too, at least so far as recognition and United Nations admission are concerned.
The extension of United States writ into Canadian business by the prohibition of China trade to U.S. subsidiaries in Canada has infringed Canadian sovereignty; U.S. law holds the parent company responsible in the event of violations by a subsidiary abroad. Canadian-produced aluminum, automobiles and refrigerators are known to have been involved. The matter has been patched up temporarily but its legislative sanction makes it hard for the State Department to handle. This aspect of sovereignty has been under study, and would benefit by further consideration, by the Canada-United States Interparliamentary group.

The long list of irritants which piled up under Foster Dulles has been mitigated. More important, some attention is now given to Canadian representations. Quotas on Canadian crude oil have been rescinded. Firesale disposal of farm surpluses has been moderated by consultation although it is still a troublesome threat for the future. A formula for the development of the Columbia River in the maximum interest of both parties is in the making. Joint operation of the St. Lawrence Seaway still poses problems, but the new atmosphere around Foggy Bottom gives hope for their solution. The Chicago “water steal” has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee to study Canadian objections. The exigencies of election-year politics may bring up new difficulties but the Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group may be useful in drawing early attention to them.

For what it’s worth, the United States has ceased to be a recipient of Canadian foreign aid. For nineteen years, the Canadian taxpayer has been doling out aid to the United States to pay for the upkeep and maintenance of an emergency landing strip at Grand Marais, Michigan, a rust-proof landing strip at that, built out of solid copper ore from local mine tailings, and maintained by the Canadian government for the convenience of TCA in the days when an emergency field every 100 miles was deemed essential. Fast modern jets have ended that need. The subsidy was discontinued this summer. U.S. officials hated to see it go. It wasn’t much, only $25,000 annually, but it gave them a pleasant feeling that the United States, in a hand-out world, was not forgotten.
For Study and Discussion

[The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, publisher of this and other series of pamphlets, special memoranda, reports, books and the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, maintains a free Information Service and Library to assist teachers, researchers, and Institute members. This service includes preparation of reading lists and study outlines for groups, lending of literature, and general assistance which may be required, as well as a Literature Buying Service. All inquiries are welcome. Write or phone (WAlnut 3-7369) 230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, Ontario.]

Study Questions

1. What has been the most significant characteristic of American foreign policy in the past few years?

2. Why was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee so eager for a change in this policy?

3. In your opinion, how vital was the significance of the questions put before Mr. Herter during his questioning by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

4. What is the hoped-for result of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower exchange of visits?

5. Outline some of the events leading up to this exchange of visits.

6. Do you think America would gain or lose under a policy that there is no alternative to peace?

7. List some outstanding world issues that the American State Department will be called upon to discuss and review.

Reading List


C.I.I.A. Literature Buying Service will secure books for readers.

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