Ottawa Foreign Policy Initiative

Sixth Seminar

DRUGS, VIOLENCE & HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

Implications and Options for Canada

Ottawa
April 27, 2011
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Preface

"Organized crime is not just infiltrating us. It pains me to say it, but drug traffickers have us cornered," Guatemala's president admitted recently.¹ The image of lawlessness combined with state incapacity that is projected by some southern regions of the Hemisphere is an alarming one. With the intention of putting the interrelated problems of drugs, crime and violence into sharper focus and formulating a set of rational responses, twenty-five specialists, governmental and non-governmental, came together in Ottawa on April 27, 2011, for a day-long discussion. Having been briefed on the incidence of these problems, they sought to arrive at a useful diagnosis pinpointing the primary causes, to evaluate what governments are presently doing and to propose initiatives that Canada could and should undertake.

The seminar was organized by the CIC Ottawa Foreign Policy Initiative, a project of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian International Council. A paper entitled "Drugs and Violence in the Americas: An Overview" by Professor Jean Daudelin of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs of Carleton University was circulated to the participants in advance as a framework for the discussions. This report is intended to capture the main issues that were debated, the arguments put forward and the conclusions that were reached on April 27. To enable frank discussion, the meeting was closed to the press and public and, by agreement with the participants, nothing that was said could be attributed to the person who said it.

¹ The Globe and Mail, January 31, 2011.
Summary

Drug violence and organized crime now represent the greatest indigenous threat to security in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, posing difficult policy challenges for Canada and its hemispheric partners. Not only are existing policy responses and resource commitments incommensurate with the scale and severity of the problem, there is great uncertainty about the effectiveness and sustainability of alternative policy options. The seminar illustrated how difficult it is to arrive at an agreed definition of the Canadian interest. At the same time, there was a strong consensus that the effects of drugs and crime emanating from Latin America and the Caribbean - effects which can, after all, be observed on the streets of Vancouver - justify a more energetic response than the Canadian government is making at present. There was likewise agreement that Canada could make the most effective use of limited resources by focusing on the military/police and judicial/legal sectors, working through existing regional mechanisms as well as through bilateral and trilateral channels. Greater donor coordination efforts, better information and intelligence sharing with partner countries, and a more systematic research program into drug violence, its genesis and organized crime were also advanced as elements of an agenda for action.
Drug Violence in the Americas - What sort of problem do we face?

Over the last decade, violence and organized crime related to the drug trade in Latin America and the Caribbean have become the most challenging of the security issues that are rooted in the Hemisphere. Over 1.4 million homicides occurred in the region during this period. With less than 9% of the global population, the region of Latin America and the Caribbean is home to approximately half the world’s homicides. This level of violence surpasses even that seen during the bloody civil wars of the 1980s. The violence is concentrated in Central America and the Caribbean, with Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil also ranking relatively high in crime statistics. In Mexico, some 19,000 drug-related deaths occurred in 2010. The majority of victims are young males, often recruited into drug trafficking organizations at an early age and inculcated with a culture of criminal violence.

Increasingly powerful Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have been expanding the range and scale of their operations. According to one seminar participant, in 2009 approximately $25 billion was laundered in Central America alone, a figure which dwarfs the budgets of the governments in the region. Cartels have diversified, taking advantage of globalization to develop more resilient enterprises, which operate with impunity. In Central America particularly, organized crime networks penetrate and destabilize the state, developing a political-criminal nexus. At the same time, the provision of security is increasingly being privatized. The proliferation of private security companies, which provide protection mainly for the wealthy but not for the impoverished, can give rise to human rights abuses and a lack of accountability, as governments no longer possess a monopoly over the use of force.

The implications of these trends for Latin America are severe. Economically, the drug trade entails large costs for affected countries; it is estimated that in Mexico between 1.5 and 7% of GNP is lost due to the battle with cartels. (The wide spread between estimates is indicative of a problem bedevilling serious analysis of this issue: the lack of reliable statistics.) Even more serious is the governance problem engendered by organized crime. Corruption and cooptation within the public service threaten the viability of the democratic process and government legitimacy. In the case of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras and some of the smaller developing states, we can go one step further and term the problem one of
national security. The risk of state failure and the emergence of ‘narco-
states’ (states in which government decisions and actions are powerfully
influenced by the drug trade) provide a platform for contagion and the
expansion of criminal networks. A further risk is that terrorist organizations
find themselves with widened margins for manoeuvre in regions where state
authority has disappeared.

2 The seminar discussed why Mexico's national security is considered to be threatened whereas
this is not the case with Brazil, which is just as corrupt. One explanation offered was that there is
a perception in Brazil that the state is strong, which is not the case in Mexico. Another
explanation was that Mexico's proximity to a larger market accounts for the difference. In-depth
study of these country comparisons appears to be warranted.
Causes of Drug Violence – Understanding a multi-dimensional problem

How can we explain the recent rise in drug violence? The seminar devoted considerable attention to the relative incapacity of Latin American states to effectively deter the activities of DTOs, allowing them to establish powerful footholds in society and in public institutions. Haiti, the Dominican Republic and much of the Commonwealth Caribbean are experiencing institutional decay. Political systems are not geared to developing and following through on long-term solutions. Guatemala, for example, currently has 27 registered political parties and eight others in the process of formation. They die away and the leaders recycle themselves, a recipe for a volatile congress. The other explanation of drug violence that is frequently raised in public discussion and cannot be ignored is the sustained demand from North American and European consumption markets, which provides lucrative sources of revenue for criminal networks and creates incentives to expand their operations. At the same time, the regional arms trade supplies DTOs with the means to carry out criminal violence and resist government authorities.

Moreover, with income distribution ratios that rank among the most unequal in the world, economies in the region are unable to accommodate the ‘youth bulge’. Upwards of half a million young people enter the job market annually with few prospects. Inequality is not only economic. Large sectors of the population believe they are at a disadvantage in terms of access to justice and impartial policing. As a result, public governance structures have decayed and a culture of criminality has become embedded in society, especially among youth. The onset of the 2008 global recession intensified these problems, enabling organized crime networks to make further inroads into societal institutions.

These factors combine to explain the current situation in Mexico. In particular, the state appears unable to effectively deter its domestic rivals or credibly threaten retributive justice for criminal violations, despite over 50,000 soldiers and 10,000 police currently being deployed on Mexico territory for the sole purpose of fighting DTOs. This failure can be attributed partly to the incapacity of Mexico’s state security sector, hampered by corruption, inadequate intelligence and information-gathering, and a lack of accountability within legal and judicial sectors. The tasks of administering the clearance process and assessing the educational level of new police recruits, for example, are far beyond the limited capacity of the Mexican
bureaucracy - only eight percent of the police force has thus far been vetted. At the same time, the harsh measures taken by the government and the escalation of violence by the cartels reflect the abandonment of whatever unwritten rules for non-violent competition (which Mexican expert Jorge Chabat has termed a "pax narcotica") might have existed before the presidency of Felipe Calderón.¹ The power equilibrium between cartels and the state has been destabilized. Thus, there are both technical-capacity and political dimensions to Mexico’s ongoing struggle.

Yet, despite the upward trajectory of violence and organized crime in many parts of the region, traditional macro-level explanations such as poverty, demographic patterns, or state institutional capacity don't apply across the board. In the southern (and poorer) regions of Mexico, for example, the homicide rate is in decline and in Nicaragua, a relatively poor country, crime rates are low, whereas in Costa Rica, a state with high institutional capacity by regional standards, officials remain worried about drug violence. Moreover, while young males are overwhelmingly the perpetrators and victims of criminal violence, gang-recruitment and violence often do not correlate directly with either poverty or inequality. Sometimes criminal gangs recruit from the middle-classes, whose members enjoy greater mobility and flexibility than the poor.

Nor is the relationship between violent crime and drugs straightforward. Countries that produce and transit drugs are associated with greater violence but not those that consume them. Violent crime has increased dramatically in the Caribbean despite the relative decline of the region's importance in trafficking due to maritime interdiction.

Consideration of such a complex web of causes makes it obvious that we confront a multi-faceted problem much broader than drugs. This presents difficulties when it comes to the selection of operational goals and deciding how we define success in tackling the problem. Given its elephantine nature, the wholesale elimination of the drug trade is an unrealistic target. Should we aim for a marked decline in the trade, and if so by how much, or should we work instead towards a decrease in the number of crimes of violence? Will more evidence be found bearing on the correlation, or lack of it, between the two? Should we shift our priorities from consumption to

¹ The opinion that such an arrangement existed is contested. See "A pax narcotica?" The Economist, January 7, 2011.
treatment or to production and distribution? One conclusion we can draw is that any policy choice should greatly depend on circumstances in the region or country to which it is applied. Most circumstances will probably call for a mix of goals, confronting the policymaker with the difficult question of how to balance them.
Policy Responses – How should we grapple with drugs and crime?

Attempts to respond to the problem have so far met with very limited success, however success may be defined. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for this is the difficulty of sustaining a concerted approach beyond the life span of a single government. The seminar was enjoined to consider inter-mandate strategies, i.e., strategies that promise to outlast a single presidential mandate. That counsel applies to governments in both the northern and southern parts of the hemisphere. Some governments burdened by the drug problem have gone in the opposite direction, foreswearing long-term strategies and opting for a management approach that targets the criminal behaviour associated with drug trafficking rather than the root causes. Drawing on both experience and the continuing debate over remedies, six broad approaches can be discerned.

State capacity reforms and institution building, particularly in relation to the police and judiciary

Strengthening judiciaries and police forces, improving systems of legal training, establishing more effective information and intelligence gathering, sharing capabilities and bolstering fiscal accountability are measures critically needed to shore up the public legitimacy of democratic governments. These amount to a long-term solution requiring significant resource commitments and technical expertise. For small Central American and Caribbean states suffering extreme capacity shortfalls, regional security mechanisms are necessary to complement national structures.

Socioeconomic development efforts aimed at reducing inequality and gang recruitment

Efforts to reduce inequality, provide legitimate economic opportunities (especially for younger demographics) and combat gang recruitment in schools target the assumed roots of criminal violence. Early interventions and guidance during pre-school ages can be critical for children's futures. These are also long-term initiatives, intended to re-engineer domestic cultures away from criminality. However, these types of intervention remain poorly understood and require further research and investment.

Repressive efforts to dismantle and destroy criminal networks

Mobilizing military and police forces to crack down on crime has been the mainstay approach for many countries, although the drawbacks of this strategy are widely acknowledged. As Peter Reuter, a senior researcher on
drug policy at the University of Maryland, has argued, "Research has almost uniformly failed to show that intensified policing or sanctions have reduced either drug prevalence or drug-related harm." Use of the military on domestic territory is problematic when the military itself has been a very recent abuser of human rights, as in several Central and South American countries. Moreover, the military is often far exceeded in numbers by the private security industry. Some countries, such as Colombia and to an extent Brazil, have been able to combine repressive efforts with building institutional capacity, moving the problem from a national security issue to the realm of public safety. Similarly, Mexican President Calderon has pursued a ‘fragment and control’ strategy, aiming to disrupt drug cartels with police and military operations, while trying to strengthen the state through institutional reforms and international cooperation. One negative consequence has been to raise the economic costs of insecurity by provoking war among the cartels. Other countries lack the resources and often the commitment to combat DTOs on their territory. Few Latin American states are prepared to fight and win a war against DTOs.

Modification of legal systems, including decriminalization and legalization

Decriminalization and legalization are means of reducing the burden on the police and judicial system, as well as shifting economic activities from the black market to the formal economy. A number of governments in Latin America are moving in this direction and yet modification of the law is problematic for production and transit countries, in part due to opposition from the United States. The policymaker must assess the possibility that the benefits of decriminalization will be outweighed by the social and health costs of increased consumption. The seminar was also reminded that governments will, in the event that the law is changed, have to get more deeply involved in regulating drugs. Government control and regulation have the effect of creating a market willing to supply at a lower cost, as in the case of illegal tobacco production in North America. Finally, some would argue that decriminalization of usage would be ineffective in reducing incarceration costs, since the vast majority of arrests are for trafficking and distribution, not consumption. Ultimately, the validity of this approach rests on the effectiveness of the regulatory system put in place and whether or not it reduces incentives for trafficking. More and more observers believe, however, that the status quo has become

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4 Dan Gardner, "Insite, crime and Harper's war on facts", The Victoria Times Colonist, May 19, 2011.
Drugs, Violence and Hemispheric Security

Untenable and that cautionary counsels should not be allowed to forestall change.

Informal arrangements and tacit agreements to accommodate drug trafficking networks Previous governments in Mexico opted for informal arrangements and tacit accommodation with drug traffickers, in order to reduce violence generated by aggressive police action and to contribute to government revenues. These arrangements allowed public officials to maintain the illusion that drug trafficking was being controlled. However, this may no longer be a viable option given the growing strength and influence of DTOs in the public sphere. Tolerance of the penetration of the state by criminal networks is clearly incompatible with democracy and accountable government. Moreover, if accommodation were practiced by the US or Canada, what kind of signal would that send to other countries? In essence we would be accepting that we do not care about drug violence in the Hemisphere, which threatens the security, democratic legitimacy, and economic growth of our partners, and is likely to affect us.

Regional/Multilateral Approaches The seminar often returned to proposals that the moral and material resources of partner countries should be enlisted in the battle with organized crime and drugs. In many circumstances, particularly in the case of the small nations of Central America and the Caribbean, an outside role is indispensable. An advantage of regional approaches is that they by-pass corrupt governments.

At the same time, few of the inter-state groupings that could take this on are particularly effective. The standing of the major international organization in the area, the Organization of American States (OAS), to which Canada makes a substantial annual contribution, is in decline. Indeed, the role of the OAS in combating crime, drugs and violence was largely absent from the seminar discussion. However, it continues to do practical work through the Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse (CICAD) and under the auspices of the Inter-American Commission on Terrorism, whose primary mandate is tackling conventional crime. An OAS secretariat for multi-dimensional security was established by the present secretary-general and is currently administered by a Canadian.
Northern Perspectives

Participants agreed that northern consuming countries are part of the drug trafficking chain and as a result should assume co-responsibility for the problem. Thus far, however, the energy and determination shown by these countries have been underwhelming, and the issue has failed to gain traction as a pressing priority despite its implications for stability and security in the hemisphere. The seminar considered the reasons for this apparent lack of will.

One such reason is that, in the perspective of the northern partners, corruption seriously detracts from the capacity of states to combat DTOs. It is difficult to ensure that partner governments are genuinely dedicated to solving problems and are not themselves committed to the status quo. Moreover, corruption may not always be voluntary but rather the result of coercion and/or blackmail, making it doubly difficult to correct. As a result, there has often been a general lack of trust between states, with limited information-sharing and intelligence cooperation.

Second, some experts experience frustration, convinced that increased resource commitments will make little difference in the face of such an enormous challenge. "Our programs are a drop in the bucket," said one participant. "How can we expect to beat the gorilla?" Counteracting the drug trade will, on account of its sheer size, require significant resource investments, which may not show positive results immediately. Sustaining large commitments for intensive counter-drug policies will be especially difficult on account of growing pressures for fiscal austerity. Moreover, without clearly understood and accepted metrics to measure success it is hard to define benchmarks and work towards common priorities.

Third, there is the risk of unintended negative consequences, as illustrated by our experience to date of shifting narcotics supply routes. If we control supply chains in Latin America without solving demand-side issues, there is a risk of pushing production and transit into other regions within the Americas or even to West Africa.

Fourth, both regional and bilateral policies are difficult to implement given the reluctance of partner states to give up sovereign control in their security sectors. Central American countries tend to think nationally. Many presidents are sensitive to any encroachment on sovereignty that
strengthened regional structures might entail. Perhaps because of that they are remarkably reticent when it comes to articulating their own needs. Mexico, in particular, is wary of collaboration, desiring to keep its distance from US policy. Moreover, Mexico doesn't appear to have a clear grasp of what the US should do.

Fifth, notwithstanding strong arguments in favour of a robust stance towards the problem, it has been hard to define a policy rationale that is compelling in the public arena. It will be difficult to sustain substantial resource investments over the length of time needed to make an impact unless there is a widely held conviction that the national interest is engaged by the Latin American and Caribbean drug trade. If drug trafficking is considered a public health and/or crime problem, which does not necessarily threaten national security, inertia is likely to prevail in both Canada and the US.

The United States

In the United States, the seminar was told, there are two immediate issues of concern: 1) the enormous ongoing costs of maintaining jails and incarcerating criminals convicted of drug-related offenses and 2) the threat that Mexico’s drug violence will cross the US border. The former issue reflects the high proportion of incarcerated Americans, higher than in any other country. The latter issue has given rise to anti-immigrant sentiment among sectors of the US population, creating political dilemmas for policymakers who must be accountable to increasingly numerous Hispanic voters.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the US attitude to Latin America’s drug problem can be described as one of confusion and indifference. To be sure, Plan Colombia is generally seen to be a success. Through the Merida Initiative, the United States has provided substantial security assistance to Mexico and some complementary assistance to Central American and Caribbean countries, but on a much smaller scale than in the case of Colombia. Spending is proving increasingly difficult to pry out of the US

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5 A multi-year partnership, involving substantial US support for Colombia's military and police forces, for the purpose of promoting the peace process, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian economy and strengthening Colombian democracy.

6 A multi-year partnership joining the US, Mexico, the nations of Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti to enable the provision of equipment and training in support of law enforcement and technical assistance directed to the reform of the partners' security agencies.
Congress as fiscal austerity begins to bite. Overall military and police assistance is decreasing significantly and there has been a shift to institution-building measures and military/police reform, with a greater focus on border security through the Department of Homeland Security.

Meanwhile, US domestic prevention and treatment programs have proven ineffective, making it difficult to reduce the demand for drugs. Admittedly, within the Obama Administration there is a desire for policy reform. The discourse of the ‘War on Drugs’ is no longer used, and the dialogue is focused on treatment rather than punishment. Thus far, however, most of the change has been limited to the rhetorical level, and budget numbers have not radically altered. Why is this the case? First, there is bureaucratic inertia within the enforcement agencies that have conducted past counter-drug policies. Second, there is a general lack of urgency regarding Latin American drug violence. As long as violence and crime are contained by the border between the US and Mexico, the American public appears to be tolerant of drug trafficking and consumption. At the same time, domestic opposition to gun control in the US makes it difficult to regulate the arms trade that supplies Mexican cartels. Domestic political partisanship also complicates policymaking efforts, particularly with the far-right wing of the Republican Party gaining in influence. In the end, it is unlikely that we will see substantially increased US investments until the situation deteriorates further.

**Canada**

The discussion revealed different views about why Canada should become more involved, whether on grounds of national security, political and/or economic interest, public safety or an altruistic concern for the well-being of the neighbourhood. It was generally agreed, however, that Canada will not remain unaffected by the crisis that has overtaken Mexico, an important trading partner, and by the deteriorating security and institutional coherence of Central American and Caribbean states. Canada hosts a significant number of diaspora groups from Latin American and Caribbean countries affected by the drug trade, forming domestic constituencies with a stake in the welfare of their home countries as well as providing potential inroads for criminal networks to expand their operations inside Canada. If Canada becomes a backdoor to the US drug market, it could provoke the Americans to thicken the Canada-US border and worsen relations with
Canada’s most important ally and trading partner. It should not be forgotten that Canada is now a world class producer and distributor of synthetic drugs.

Canada has assumed at least some of the responsibilities of a hemispheric partner in combating the drug trade, especially in the areas of police and military reform. The instruments for carrying out this role have primarily been the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Military Training and Cooperation Program of the Department of National Defence (DND) and contributions to regional programs run by the OAS and the United Nations (UN). These efforts have been focused mostly on Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico. One initiative already receiving Canadian support is the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which implants Western experts in the legal and judicial system to root out corruption. Nevertheless, Canada’s current commitments are exceedingly modest, by no means commensurate with the magnitude of the problem, especially one occurring in ‘our own backyard’. Canada is under growing international pressure to become more seriously engaged.
An Agenda for Action

This pressure is mounting just as the Canadian government has received a new and stronger electoral mandate. Now is the time for establishing goals and setting a new course. Despair is unwarranted, participants were told at the final session of the seminar. What measures would they recommend to the newly re-elected government? They came up with a wide range of recommendations, as follows:

1. Institutional development and capacity-building should continue to be the centrepiece of the Canadian effort. In addition to police and military sectors, this should encompass fiscal accountability, anti-corruption measures and legal training for lawyers.\(^7\) Canada's Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program should be funded at a more generous level and would benefit from an expert review that would provide better focus, direction and coordination. Worthwhile innovations would be a better civilian deployment framework and a program bringing police officers to Canada for training, modeled on the present military training program. More emphasis should be placed on capacity transfer rather than simply capacity build-up. Canada can assist the development of a stronger regional security institution for the island states in the Caribbean through funding and technical expertise. It was argued that Canadian agencies are overly protective of their intelligence, which impedes the ability of partner governments to prosecute criminals. Stronger regional information-sharing networks should, therefore, complement domestic institutional reforms. The seminar also heard a plea for better Spanish language skills on the part of Canada’s police and military.

2. Canada should also strongly encourage multilateral/regional cooperation, especially in the Caribbean where national structures are overwhelmed. In addition to support for existing organizations, such as Ameripol (American Police Community),\(^8\) Caricom (Caribbean Community),\(^9\) and SICA (Central American Integration System),\(^10\) new forms of regionalism and multi-level

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7 One interesting suggestion was that taping trials would be a step in the right direction as far as fighting corruption in the judiciary is concerned.

8 Ameripol is a continental police organization founded in 2007 with the mission of fighting illicit drug production, drug trafficking and related crimes. Some seminar participants were critical of Ameripol's current capabilities.

9 Caricom, which includes the Single Market and Economy, was originally set up in 1973 by the leaders of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

10 SICA is the main instrument of regional integration in Central America and includes as full members the states of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
security mechanisms should be tried. A regional mechanism to battle judicial impunity and corruption should be a priority, since many justice systems are too tolerant of judicial misconduct.

3. Canada should pressure partner governments to undertake taxation and fiscal reforms so that they begin to shoulder more of the financial burden of the battle with drugs and crime. The resources for sustainable capacity-building must chiefly come from within Latin American countries. Donor countries such as Canada should increase their efforts but should not be expected to bear the brunt of the offensive for years to come. This is a difficult message to deliver, but it is critical for the sustainability of the battle with DTOs.

4. Canada should demonstrate the seriousness of its intent to its hemispheric partners by implementing greater efforts to interdict drug trafficking. Systematically deploying Aurora reconnaissance aircraft to operate with a Canadian or other warship in the Caribbean for drug traffic interdiction is a relatively low cost procedure that has been shown to diminish the flow of drugs north and reduce the profitability of trafficking. Effective interdiction flies a flag that cheers one's friends and spreads discouragement among the enemy.

5. Canada should lend its support to efforts to improve the tracing of money laundering.

6. Canada should work to strengthen the framework for international action. This means improving international coordination, intelligence sharing and the commitment of partner countries. A positive first step would be support for the drafting of an international charter setting out the fundamental priorities of governments to counteract the drug trade. Regional funding programs should provide incentives to recipient countries by setting standards for accessing funds. Inter-departmental coordination should not stop at government's edge but attempt to include civil society partners as well.

7. Canada should fund domestic efforts to reduce consumption and demand in North America and Europe through a public health campaign, analogous to tobacco-control efforts that have drastically reduced usage over recent decades.
8. A sustained and imaginative effort must be made to partner with the Canadian private sector, recognizing the central role that private companies play in furthering socioeconomic objectives in partner countries. The cessation of gang recruitment and the reversal of economic inequality are critical to the long-term resolution of drug violence. The growth of small and medium-sized enterprises would draw more people into the formal economy.

9. Canada should assist with the funding of a more comprehensive research and data-collection effort. The seminar was repeatedly reminded of the inadequacies in current statistics and the absence of clear, well established data on which to base sound policy. Better policy evaluation and diagnostic tools using cross-country analysis are needed to understand drug violence and assess the effectiveness of existing policies. The International Development Research Centre is a potential location for this work, and should be linked with local experts from recipient countries. Research is an area where Canada can make a significant difference.

Seminar participants wanted Canada to shift and refocus its priorities, targeting its expertise where it could be most effective. Working with local authorities in Mexico, for example, might produce better results than large, nation-wide programs. In regard to the Caribbean and Central America, they advised opting for multilateral responses. If wariness and lack of trust make it difficult to work with certain countries in dire straits then Canada should try a trilateral approach in company with other hemispheric countries that are currently managing their drug and crime problems more successfully.

Refocusing priorities will help but without increased funding won't begin to make a transformational difference. More money is needed to fund even a handful of programs at a level that forces people to pay attention. Indeed, Canada would be a more effective player with the credibility gained by increasing its investment. To be sure, the recommendations coming from the seminar would add to the fiscal burden that Canada's government is already struggling to lighten. The seminar participants on April 27, however, appeared united in the conviction that the enormity and proximity of the problem constitute a challenge that no country with Canada's endowments and capabilities can possibly ignore.
The CIC Ottawa Foreign Policy Initiative

The CIC Ottawa Foreign Policy Initiative was established by the National Capital Branch of the Canadian International Council (CIC) in 2008, after the Branch had received a grant from the International Development Research Centre to develop its capacity. The mission of the Initiative is to bring together senior members of the Public Service of Canada who shoulder international responsibilities with experts from the policy community outside government in order to analyse major foreign policy issues confronting Canada, forecast opportunities and challenges in the medium term and assess the direction and effectiveness of current policy in light of the forecast. This is chiefly accomplished by means of a series of seminars, of which six have been held thus far.


Advisory Council

At the apex of the organizational structure is a small advisory council composed of individuals with credibility, expertise and contacts in the various subjects to be explored. The Council is headed by Mel Cappe (Professor in the School of Public Policy and Governance of the University of Toronto and former Clerk of the Privy Council). The members of the Council are: Derek H. Burney (Senior Strategic Advisor, Ogilvy Renault LLP), Louise Fréchette (Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation and former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations), Anne Golden (President and CEO, Conference Board of Canada), Fen Hampson (Director, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University), Peter Harder (Senior Policy Advisor, Fraser Milner Casgrain and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Jennifer Jeffs (President, Canadian International Council), Luc Juillet (Director, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa), Gaëtan Lavertu (former ambassador and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Alex Neve (Secretary-General, Amnesty International Canada), Don Newman (retired Senior Parliamentary Editor, CBC), Irvin Studin (Editor-in-Chief and Publisher, Global Brief Magazine), Jodi White (former President of the Public Policy Forum) and Elizabeth Yeh (Publisher, AsiaNetwork.)

Organizing Committee

A CIC Organizing Committee undertakes the planning and organization of the Initiative's program. The Committee is composed of Craig Hunter and Gerald Wright (co-chairs), Barbara Darling, John Graham, David Lee, Carole Nap, Bill Neil and Louise Terrillon-Mackay.

Acknowledgements

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